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INTRODUCTION 
In evaluating the forays of Robert Post, David Bernstein, and Howard 
Gillman into the history of Lochner-era jurisprudence, Barry Cushman comes 
to accept that there are at least two faces of Lochnerism.1  The early twentieth-
century invalidation of a number of “economic” regulations, he says, rested 
sometimes on a principle of equality – the disapproval of “class legislation” 
emphasized by Gillman – and sometimes on a principle of liberty 
(characterized in different ways by Post and Bernstein) to the effect that certain 
areas of each individual’s life must be treated as immune to the government’s 
regulatory powers altogether.2  Cushman also acknowledges, however, that 
these two principles might really be one.3  Just as the idioms of constitutional 
equality and constitutional liberty in the present day can often (or always) be 
said to supply equally eligible modes for arguing against any particular 
government action, so might the analogous idioms of the Lochner era.  Rather 
than try to resolve the question whether there was only one or maybe two faces 
of Lochnerism – or three if you separate Post and Bernstein – I will instead 
offer what may be an additional face of Lochnerism. 
To find another angle on Lochnerism, I thought I would look at the 
jurisprudence of the man commonly thought to be the Lochner wing’s fiercest 
foe, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.  Holmes wrote the famously stinging 
dissents in Lochner and Adkins v. Children’s Hospital4 and generally seems to 
have advocated a jurisprudence that was antithetical to that of the Lochner 
Court.  But the compelling reason for looking at Holmes is not that he was a 
reliably anti-Lochner justice, consistently pointing out the flaws in that 
jurisprudence.  Rather, as Cushman notes, he joined many a Lochner-era 
majority in striking down a number of economic regulations.5  He even wrote 
 
∗  
1 Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 B.U. L. REV. xx, 
xx (2005) (asserting that there are two interpretations of Lochner-era decisions: the 
traditional, which holds that these decisions were based on the principle of neutrality, and 
the more recent, which holds that these decisions were based on the principle of individual 
liberty and autonomy).  
2 Id. at xx. 
3 Id. at xx (attempting to reconcile Gillman’s “class legislation” theory with both 
Bernstein’s “liberty of contract” theory and Post’s “lifeworld” hypothesis). “”“” 
4 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
5 Cushman, supra note 1 at xx (citing cases where Holmes, as part of the majority, struck 
down various economic regulations).   
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quite a few opinions in such cases.  So what do we make of him?  Was he 
important mainly as a kind of legal crank or prophet, irrelevant in his own 
time, however much he might speak to later generations?  Or was he in fact a 
mainstream justice, whose unique powers of expression and rhetorical 
iconoclasm only manifested the main lines of Lochner-era jurisprudence in an 
especially revealing manner? 
To explore these questions, I’ll look at a more or less arbitrarily limited run 
of Holmes’s own judicial writing in Fourteenth Amendment cases.  Without 
doing a comprehensive, independent search of my own, I gathered all of the 
Holmes Fourteenth Amendment opinions that I was able to find in a quick 
search of Cushman’s and others’ footnotes.  I’ll also take a look at the 
irresistible Adkins dissent (a Fifth Amendment case), but otherwise I’ve 
excluded Fifth Amendment cases and Commerce Clause cases, despite close 
doctrinal relevance.  I think these opinions represent most of what Holmes 
wrote in this area, but in any case they certainly represent a pretty good 
sample. 
The result of my reading is a few observations about the structure of 
Holmes’s jurisprudence regarding constitutional review of economic cases and 
how his chosen rhetoric might signify differences from and similarities to the 
constitutional idioms discussed in Cushman’s paper.  These suggestions are: 1) 
that Holmes advocated a somewhat more pointed rule of deference to 
legislatures than did most of his colleagues, but that his language in this 
respect was far less radical than is often supposed;6 2) that, while he expressed 
disgust at the uses to which the language of “liberty of contract” and the 
language of “classification” were put, his own deployment of “takings” 
language in a number of cases manifested values and concerns very similar to 
those of the other justices; 3) that, in cases that others might decide by 
reference to unconstitutional conditions,7 he seized the chance to vindicate a 
rather extreme version of state autonomy that he thought indispensable to the 
“scheme of the Union” even after the Fourteenth Amendment had scaled back 
states’ rights; in the face of the ever-expanding federal commerce power, the 
Court had to preserve some residual principle of state power – not because 
state autonomy was a good idea but simply because the Constitution still 
commanded judges to recognize some such sphere. 
Running through these propositions, moreover, was Holmes’s eagerness to 
find positive law and follow wherever it led.8  For the most part, Holmes really 
 
6 See, e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 131 (1993); Jack M. 
Balkin, Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. LAW REV. xx, xx (2005).   
7 On unconstitutional conditions, see generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional 
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989).  For a thorough survey of the cases in 
Holmes’s time, see generally Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and 
Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935). 
8 Holmes’s positivism is, of course, widely acknowledged.  See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, 
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 120 (1993) (observing that 
Holmes’s positivism was one of his chief jurisprudential commitments). 
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wasn’t interested in defending any particular substantive policies of his own 
but only his (sometimes perverse) desire to make himself into a great judge by 
slavishly following positive law (including his chaste understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment), almost relishing the badness of the social or 
economic policy that might result from his decisions.  But did that positivism 
and arguable perversity of temperament fundamentally separate him from the 
other Justices?  Or did the substance of his constitutional theory actually put 
him more or less in the mainstream of the Court?  The evidence of his opinions 
suggests that he served less as prophet or as conscience of the Court and more 
as the greatest – or only – literary figure of the Lochner Court.  He used his 
words as weapons to puncture platitudes, expose the empty lawyers’ rhetoric 
of so many opinions, and thus clarify the true stakes and motives driving the 
justices’ opinions.  But, as important as such rhetorical contributions were and 
are, it is equally true and important that he did not separate himself much from 
his fellow justices’ methods, values, and jurisprudence. 
I. THE LOCHNER DISSENT AND JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 
Holmes’s Lochner dissent is probably more famous than any of the other 
opinions in the case, and some of the individual aphorisms in the case are 
probably even more famous than the dissent as a whole.  Yet the sting of the 
dissent turns out to serve a far less radical legal position than is sometimes 
supposed. 
First, the Lochner dissent did not so much reject “liberty of contract” as a 
category of constitutional analysis as embrace a traditional kind of restraint in 
using such categories.  Responding to a majority opinion that rested squarely 
on liberty of contract and the heightened scrutiny that protection of that liberty 
demanded of the Court, Holmes exposed the relativity of any such “right” by 
pointing out how often it had been eroded with the Court’s blessing.9  Given 
that record and tradition, the judge’s role was generally to let legislatures do 
what they wanted with this fluid “right.”10  And Holmes was far from alone in 
advocating such substantial deference.  The dissent of Harlan, joined by White 
and Day, said that “the rule is universal that a legislative enactment . . . is 
never to be disregarded or held invalid unless it be, beyond question, plainly 
and palpably in excess of legislative power” or “unless the regulations are so 
utterly unreasonable and extravagant in their nature and purpose that the 
 
9 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (demonstrating 
that the Court frequently upheld statutes “cutting down the liberty of contract”).  A nice 
discussion of Holmes’s well known impatience with “rights” can be found in G. Edward 
White’s account of the Lochner dissent in JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE 
INNER SELF 328 (1993) (discussing how Holmes was “deeply suspicious” of words like 
“right” and “liberty of contract,” because he thought of them as “vague generalizations,” 
and “nothing but prophecies”). 
10 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Constitution does 
not embody a particular economic theory, and that the Court should not determine the 
constitutionality of statutes based on their own opinions). 
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property and personal rights of the citizen are unnecessarily, and in a manner 
wholly arbitrary, interfered with or destroyed  . . . .”11  These words, like 
Holmes’s, were pretty strong, but they only echoed the “reasonable doubt” or 
“doubtful case” rule, which had peppered constitutional opinions since at least 
the early nineteenth century and which remained an established doctrine of 
constitutional law into the Lochner Era.12  Harlan’s call for restraint simply 
paralleled Holmes’s own insistence that legislatures be allowed wide freedom, 
limited only by “fundamental principles” of law.13 
So why didn’t Holmes join Harlan’s dissent?  His own opinion suggests that 
he objected only to Harlan’s willingness to resort to empirical evidence to 
sustain the reasonableness of the Lochner statute as a health regulation.  
Contrasting his opinion to Harlan’s, Holmes insisted that “[i]t does not need 
research” to show that the statute could be understood as rationally related to 
the state’s interest in public health.14  To sign on to the other dissenters’ 
empirical “research” on that score was to say that a legislature’s impingement 
on the liberty of contract (real, though it was) was something special, requiring 
special fact-finding and justification – beyond common sense and dominant 
opinion – rather than simple judicial recognition of the plausibility of the 
statute.  So did this separate him from Harlan’s jurisprudence in some 
important way? Or did it simply reflect his rhetorical combativity? Perhaps he 
exhibited a deeper insight into the scope of judicial competence, but he evinced 
little difference from Harlan in methods of actually deciding cases. 
After all, Harlan had not declared that such empirical evidence was 
necessary, and his statement of the standard of judicial review certainly didn’t 
suggest so; he just saw no reason to ignore such evidence, apparently, when it 
was easily available.  And, like Harlan, Holmes was very clear that he too 
would strike down legislation in the right case.15  Thus, immediately after 
announcing the “general proposition” that judges’ pet economic theories or 
other notions of good policy should not control their judgments in 
constitutional cases, Holmes declared that, “General propositions do not decide 
concrete cases.”16  He was not referring here (as I had always casually 
assumed) to the majority’s arid principles of liberty of contract or laissez-faire 
– or at least not immediately to them.  Instead, he referred most immediately to 
his own “proposition just stated,” that judges should not use the Fourteenth 
 
11 Id. at 67-68 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
12 For the early period, see, for example, SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE 
LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 60-65, 130-32, 157-61 (1990) (tracing the “doubtful case” rule 
through 18th- and 19th-century cases).  For a statement nearly contemporaneous with the 
Lochner period, see James B. Thayer’s classic article, The Origin and Scope of the 
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). 
13 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. (contending that a law could be invalidated on constitutional grounds so long as a 
rational man would conclude that the law infringed on fundamental principles of law). 
16 Id. 
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Amendment as an excuse to “prevent the natural outcome of a dominant 
opinion” – i.e., to invalidate a statute.17  Applicable as that general principle of 
restraint might prove to be in Lochner, it was equally true, he suggested, that 
judges should intervene whenever a rational person would have to admit that a 
statute flouted “fundamental principles as they have been understood by the 
traditions of our people and our law.”18 
In other words, although Holmes had made a big deal of his own 
commitment to restraint, he also acknowledged that that restraint must bow 
before the more general principle that judges had to recognize when 
fundamental principles had been violated, just as the Lochner majority had.  In 
the end, he disagreed with the majority only on the question whether the New 
York statute really was a plausible health regulation, and with Harlan only on 
the question whether discussion of available empirical research was called for 
in deflating the majority’s assumptions.  Although Holmes wielded a terribly 
sharp rhetorical knife, he used it to defend a traditional and conventional 
theory of constitutional review.  If he didn’t mind turning that knife even on 
his allies, that was less because there was a deep jurisprudential gulf between 
him and Harlan than because, as a matter of aesthetics as much as anything 
else, he preferred to dismiss a mistaken majority in a handful of paragraphs 
that would offer no respect or quarter to the purveyors of judicial pretense. 
Holmes subsequently reiterated his commitment to restraint on a number of 
occasions, but his Adkins dissent deserves special notice.  There, Holmes 
reiterated his Lochner argument in the context of federal legislation and the 
Fifth (rather than Fourteenth) Amendment.19  Writing only a few years after 
Bunting v. Oregon20 had apparently offered Lochner “a deserved repose,”21 
Holmes impatiently expanded on his earlier resistance to the notion that liberty 
of contract was something special in constitutional analysis: “The earlier 
decisions . . . went no farther than an unpretentious assertion of the liberty to 
follow the ordinary callings.  Later that innocuous generality was expanded 
into the dogma, Liberty of Contract.”22  In reality, he argued, a statute’s 
impingement on liberty of contract revealed very little about whether the 
statute was constitutional or not, as his citations to a flood of cases easily 
proved.23  Holmes’s impatience with the majority’s “dogma” extended as well 
 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 568-71 (1923) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
20 243 U.S. 426, 433-34, 438 (1917) (sustaining a statute establishing a ten-hour 
maximum work day and providing time-and-a-half overtime pay for up to three hours per 
day for factory workers as a valid exercise of state power on the grounds that it was 
necessary to preserve employee health). 
21 Adkins, 261 U.S. at 570 (Holmes, J. dissenting). 
22 Id. at 568. 
23 Id. at 568-69 (citing examples of laws that had been upheld despite interfering with the 
liberty of contract). 
  6 
to arguments in the “class legislation” idiom: “The fact that the statute 
warrants classification, which like all classifications may bear hard upon some 
individuals, . . . is no greater infirmity than is incident to all law.”24  But 
Holmes did not condemn all judicial intervention by way of the Due Process 
Clause.  As argued further below, Holmes happily invalidated legislation when 
he could do so in terms of “takings,” and he would have been happy to strike 
down the statute in Adkins if its chosen means had “compel[led] anybody to 
pay anything” or otherwise appeared assimilable to an unconstitutional 
“taking.”25  Finding, however, that the Adkins statute suggested no taking by 
the authorities, Holmes again disdained the government’s effort to prove the 
value of the legislation by reference to empirical research when the merest 
glance at the realities of the world (through the lens of judicial notice) showed 
all that needed to be shown – that is, that reasonable persons might believe the 
statute to serve the “public good.”26 
A nice tip-off that Holmes’s own colleagues considered his distinctiveness 
to lie more in his rhetoric than in his jurisprudence comes in Chief Justice 
Taft’s dissent in Adkins.  The rather conservative Taft wrote separately from 
Holmes not because of any serious disagreement on the substance of Holmes’s 
objections but because of Holmes’s rhetorical vehemence and sweep: “But for 
my inability to agree with some general observations in the forcible opinion of 
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, who follows me, I should be silent and merely record 
my concurrence in what he says.”27 
In sum, if Holmes could not restrain his rhetoric as he responded to the 
evasions and dogmas of his colleagues’ written work, he hardly invented or 
even extended the brand of judicial restraint that he so colorfully advertised 
and that many, if not all, of his colleagues practiced with him. 
II. “TAKINGS” CASES 
Holmes’s conventionality becomes all the more clear when one considers 
that he joined his colleagues quite a few times in using the Fourteenth 
Amendment to invalidate statutes and wrote a number of the opinions in those 
cases himself.  He may have preferred the language of “takings” to that of 
“liberty” or “equality,” perhaps because it seemed to offer a more disciplined 
sort of rhetoric for a judge, a rhetoric more conducive to his own overriding 
ambition to achieve judicial greatness when all around him appeared so sloppy 
and political.  Nevertheless, his own chosen language necessarily left him 
making the same kinds of judgments that the rest of the Court made with their 
sometimes different rhetorical tools. 
The main category of cases in which Holmes’s opinions for the Court 
invalidated legislation involved what he saw as a takings aspect of the 
 
24 Id. at 570. 
25 Id.  See infra pp. 10-18 (discussing cases where Holmes invalidated legislation based 
on unconstitutional takings). 
26 Adkins, 261 U.S. at 570-71. 
27 Id. at 567 (Taft, J., dissenting). 
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Fourteenth Amendment, not the Takings Clause as such nor the Takings 
Clause as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment.  When Holmes 
identified a “taking of private property” without adequate compensation, he did 
not hesitate to step in and strike down the statute any more than his colleagues 
might have done when spying an “arbitrary classification” or an erosion of the 
“liberty of contract.”  Taken one way, his Lochner dissent might have 
suggested that, as long as “dominant opinion” considered a regulated party’s 
loss non-compensable, the usual and justifiable sort of price that one pays for 
living in a well regulated society, then judges should never interfere.  But, as 
shown above, the engaging rhetoric of the dissent added up to no such position.  
It ultimately stood only for the pedestrian proposition that judges had to make 
judgments, that they had to reason as best they could about when a statute 
crossed the line of irrationality, and thus unconstitutionality, in light of 
American traditions.  Holmes freely made that judgment whenever he thought 
a statute looked too much like a taking of private property, whether in the form 
of money exacted, labor compelled, tangible property appropriated, or even 
opportunities for profit denied. 
Thus, for example, in Louisville and Nashville Railroad v. Central Stock 
Yards Co.,28 a provision of Kentucky’s Constitution required one railway to 
surrender its cars to another for the final leg of a trip without, according to 
Holmes, affording the first carrier compensation for the temporary loss of its 
property and its use by another party: 
In view of the well-known and necessary practice of connecting roads, we 
are far from saying that a valid law could not be passed to prevent the 
cost and loss of time entailed by needless transhipment or breaking bulk, 
in case of an unreasonable refusal by a carrier to interchange cars with 
another for through traffic.  We do not pass upon the question.  It is 
enough to observe that such a law perhaps ought to be so limited as to 
respect the paramount needs of the carrier concerned, and at least could 
be sustained only with full and adequate regulations for his protection 
from the loss or undue detention of cars, and for securing due 
compensation for their use.  The Constitution of Kentucky is simply a 
universal, undiscriminating requirement, with no adequate provisions 
such as we have described.29 
As these words suggest, Holmes did not doubt that the Kentucky regulation 
had very plausible justification as a facilitation of commerce within the state.  
But rather than simply deem this the sort of regulation for which a reasonable 
person could easily divine the public justification, Holmes judged it a 
deprivation of property without due process of law, at least so long as 
Kentucky failed to provide adequate compensation.30 
 
28 212 U.S. 132, 139 (1909) (citing the Kentucky Constitution, which stated that all 
railroad companies were required to transport, receive, load and unload all freight passing 
through without discrimination as to payment or charges). 
29 Id. at 143-44. 
30 Id. at 145. 
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Another aspect of the same Kentucky regulation required one railroad to 
provide switching services to another under certain circumstances, even though 
those services were not separately paid for: “If the principle is sound, every 
road into Louisville, by making a physical connection with the Louisville & 
Nashville, can get the use of its costly terminals and make it do the switching 
necessary to that end, upon simply paying for the service of carriage.”31  Not 
only did the state compel the use of private property for public ends, but it 
compelled a private company to provide labor and services to another for these 
same ends.  “To require such [services] from a railroad is to take its property in 
a very effective sense, and cannot be justified unless the railroad holds that 
property subject to greater liabilities than those incident to its calling alone.”32  
For Holmes this was essentially a takings case, a case that could be 
distinguished from ordinary regulation since the state compelled a person to 
part with physical property and, perhaps even more compellingly, to provide 
services and labor that it had not freely committed itself to by virtue of 
entering into the “calling” of railroading. 
Similarly, in Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Nebraska,33 Holmes assumed 
the legitimacy of a statutory effort to prevent a grain-elevator monopoly.  He 
even assumed that the statute might require a railroad to service elevators other 
than its own.34  But he bridled at the requirement that the railroad itself build 
and pay for the necessary side tracks and do so whenever the operator of such 
an elevator so requested.35  Using the conventional judicial language of the 
day, Holmes declared, “Clearly, no such obligation is incident to their public 
duty, and to impose it goes beyond the limit of the police power.”36  Even if 
the statute were shrunk to a more reasonable shape, Holmes wondered, “Why 
should the railroads pay for what, after all, are private connections?  We see no 
reason.”37  Holmes perhaps bridled at the thought that the railroad could be 
compelled to construct these tracks (as he bridled at the Kentucky railroad’s 
being required to perform services it had not contracted for), but ultimately he 
only insisted that they could not be required to go uncompensated for the work: 
“[T]his statute is unconstitutional . . . because it does not provide indemnity for 
what it requires.”38 
In Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Commission of Louisiana,39 Holmes 
similarly and impatiently found that the Fourteenth Amendment prevented the 
Railroad Commission of Louisiana from compelling a company to provide 
 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 217 U.S. 196 (1910). 
34 Id. at 206-07. 
35 Id. at 207. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 208. 
39 251 U.S. 396 (1920). 
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services that could not be operated at a profit.40  The company had run a 
railroad at a profit as long as its parent company’s logging business had paid a 
large share of the freight.41  When the parent company ran out of logs, the 
railroad shut down, but the state Railroad Commission ordered it to continue 
operations as long as the losses did not use up the profits of the parent 
company.42  Holmes and the Court found this order “would deprive the 
plaintiff of its property without due process of law, contrary to the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States . . . .”43  After all, even 
though public needs might justify a requirement that a railroad fulfill its charter 
obligations even when it could only do so at a loss, the private decision to stop 
operating the railroad altogether was different: “The plaintiff may be making 
money from its sawmill and lumber business but it no more can be compelled 
to spend that than it can be compelled to spend any other money to maintain a 
railroad for the benefit of others who do not care to pay for it.”44  Here as 
elsewhere, Holmes could as easily have said that this order was 
unconstitutional as the equivalent of “class legislation,” a naked redistribution 
of property from A to B; or he could have called it a violation of the railroad’s 
“liberty of contract,” its freedom to contract or not with whomever it chose for 
whatever services it chose to provide.  Any of these idioms would have made 
sense of the case, and each of them would have (and did) require an exercise of 
judgment, not a mechanical application of a clear rule. 
Finally, in Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Everglades Drainage District,45 
Holmes was able to identify a “definite sum of money” to which the boat 
company was entitled and which the state sought to keep.46  The company had 
paid certain tolls under duress at a time when no such tolls were authorized by 
the state.47  The state then sought to keep the money through retroactive 
legislation (“ratification” of the tolls).48  But the state’s argument, said Holmes, 
once “[s]tripped of conciliatory phrases” – Holmes’s favorite activity – simply 
sought to “take away from a private party a right to recover money that [was] 
due when the act [was] passed.”49  The state could no more extinguish this 
right to a definite sum of money “without compensation” than it could 
extinguish a conventional “claim for goods sold.”50 
Relying on the language of takings, even though the Takings Clause itself 
was inapplicable to these cases, Holmes disdained the languages of liberty and 
 
40 Id. at 399. 
41 Id. at 398. 
42 Id. at 398-99. 
43 Id. at 397. 
44 Id. at 399. 
45 258 U.S. 338 (1922). 
46 Id. at 340. 
47 Id. at 338. 
48 Id.. 
49 Id. at 339. 
50 Id. at 340. 
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equality, presumably because they had proven overly attractive excuses for the 
judiciary’s second-guessing of legislatures.  Holmes’s “takings” cases, in 
contrast, drew on more explicit language and tradition, or so he seems to have 
believed.  For a judge who really was more interested in achieving greatness in 
his calling than in pressing a particular substantive agenda for the nation, those 
virtues of the takings idiom would have been very seductive. 
Another benefit of that idiom, though, might have been that it did advance a 
major part of Holmes’s constitutional agenda, his conviction that individual 
rights were never absolute – hardly “rights” at all in the face of the ever-
present and necessarily superior demands of the public interest.  The language 
of takings never formally prevented whatever regulation the state saw fit to 
enact; it never set up a right that was above utilitarian calculation.  It only 
required that the state pay for its regulations, at least in those cases where the 
traditions of American law would unmistakably identify a compensable seizure 
of a person’s labor, money, or physical property. 
Here I might cite a passage from the criminal law chapter of Holmes’s THE 
COMMON LAW, a passage that suggests that Holmes understood the 
requirement of just compensation as having little to do with individual property 
or contract rights and much to do with the necessity of protecting public power 
by preventing it from undermining itself.  Viewing criminal law as simply one 
of many branches of social regulation, not altogether different from later 
Progressive reform legislation, he impatiently disparaged the notion that 
individuals have any unregulable “rights,” such as the Kantian right not to be 
used as means to public ends.51  Yet he also provided a limiting principle for 
the broad, utilitarian legislative discretion he thereby endorsed: a legislature 
must not sacrifice the individual irrationally by imposing rules that are “too 
severe for that community to bear.”52 And, to illustrate, he used a takings 
analogy: the community, he noted, will seize “old family places” from 
individuals for public use, regardless of claims of property or other rights, and 
it must be allowed to do so in the public interest.53  But, of course, the 
community also traditionally pays market compensation for the taking – an 
amount probably inadequate to the deprived owner but adequate in the eyes of 
a reasonable member of the community.54  All communities sacrifice the 
individual’s interests for the sake of the public’s, but no civilized community 
sacrifices the individual more than necessary, Holmes said.55  Why?  Because 
doing so would itself undermine the public interest, would manifest not a 
violation of individual rights but a rule “too severe for that community to 
 
51 O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 43, 46-47 (1881) (claiming that our criminal 
law does “treat the individual as a means to an end, and uses him as a tool to increase the 
general welfare at his own expense”). 
52 Id. at 50. 
53 Id. at 43 (alleging that a civilized government will not sacrifice the citizen more than it 
can help, but will sacrifice the citizen’s “will and welfare” for the good of the rest). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
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bear,”56 a rule “too hard for the average member of the community,”57 a rule 
that must defeat its own purposes because it violates the well founded 
judgments of the main body of the community.  The takings idiom, it would 
seem, was specially congenial to Holmes’s view of law as a positive emanation 
of state power rather than as a catalogue of “rights.” 
If Holmes embraced such an argument for the use of “takings” language 
rather than his colleagues’ preferred idioms, he still had to acknowledge that it 
was judges – not the unmediated voice of “the community” – who must apply 
the Constitution to particular cases.  And judges could have done the work of 
judicial review – imparted their measure of rationality to state power – through 
any of the idioms of constitutional law then current.  Holmes seemed to glom 
on to the language of takings because of its relative determinacy and its easy 
affinity with the Fourteenth Amendment’s own language of deprivation of 
property.  But determinacy is often in the eye of the beholder.  If it has not 
already been obvious that Holmes’s own takings opinions were far from 
determinate applications of takings rules, then Holmes’s most famous takings 
case, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,58 clearly makes the point. 
Mahon presents a Holmes who was as ready as any of his colleagues simply 
to judge matters of degree in constitutional law rather than deferring to the 
legislature whenever a reasonable person might endorse the statute.  To this 
point, perhaps Holmes had not had to confront so starkly his awareness that the 
difference between a regulation and a taking could not always be easily drawn.  
The cases discussed above contained pretty plausible examples of regulations 
that looked overtly like takings from the outset, never even triggering the usual 
rhetoric of deference to legislative judgment.  But Mahon was trickier, 
suggesting that the deferential review Holmes abstractly advocated for most 
Fourteenth Amendment cases was being arbitrarily disregarded in Holmes’s 
practically de novo review in takings cases. 
In Mahon, the coal company was not compelled to perform any service, nor 
deprived directly of any of its property or money.  It was simply deprived of a 
preexisting right to mine coal – an opportunity for future profits – insofar as 
the mining would cause subsidence of the residential lots overhead.59  The 
statute might thus be a regulation of property or it might be a taking.  So 
Holmes had to acknowledge that the question was a matter of degree: “The 
general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, 
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”60  Unlike in the 
previous cases he had written, the taking here was not a simple matter of 
common sense and “general propositions,” a case of knowing it when he saw 
it: “As we already have said this is a question of degree – and therefore cannot 
be disposed of by general propositions.  But we regard this as going beyond 
 
56 Id. at 50. 
57 Id. at 57. 
58 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
59 Id. at 412-13. 
60 Id. at 415. 
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any of the cases decided by this Court.”61 
Recognizing that the question whether there was a “taking” here was just a 
matter of degree, he nevertheless failed to intimate that the state deserved any 
deference for its policy.  Nor did he argue, as his Lochner standard should have 
required, that this regulation would necessarily be deemed unreasonable by any 
rational and fair person.  (With Justice Brandeis dissenting, he may not have 
relished such an argument.)  For Holmes, it was simply the case that the 
Fourteenth Amendment banned takings and that this regulation seemed like a 
taking.  Why did it seem so?  Simply because, if judged otherwise, this 
regulation might threaten the very survival of “private property,”62 a fairly silly 
and uncharacteristically melodramatic argument for Holmes. 
In this case, judging degrees as he was, Holmes might as well have 
concluded that the regulation deprived the coal company of its “liberty of 
contract” or transferred its property from A (the coal company) to B (the 
surface residents).  But he did not.  Instead, he relied again on the idiom of 
takings, apparently to replace the dogmas of the Lochnerites with a principle 
that, unlike “Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics,”63 was indeed explicitly 
enacted in the Constitution as positive law.  But that language eventually 
returned him to questions of degree and indeterminacy anyway, in the face of 
which he cheerily denied to the legislature of Pennsylvania in 1922 the sort of 
deference he had championed for the legislature of New York in 1905. 
III. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS 
If Holmes’s positivist formalism in takings cases tended to erase his 
philosophy of deference, he adopted a different formalist extreme when 
confronted with claims of unconstitutional conditions.  In these cases, he 
insisted that there were areas of regulation where the states retained a degree of 
autonomy and sovereignty that precluded even the most deferential rationality 
review. Where the state could have “arbitrarily” prohibited the conditioned 
activity at the outset, Holmes argued, even the most irrational subsequent 
conditions on the activity were beyond federal constitutional review. 
In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman,64 Holmes 
dissented from an invalidation of a Kansas “charter fee,” imposed by the state 
on the corporation as a condition of doing business within the state.65  The fee 
might be excessive or otherwise unjustifiable, but the entry of a foreign 
corporation into the state to do local business was “a matter over which a state 
 
61 Id. at 416. 
62 Id. at 415 (arguing that when the Fourteenth Amendment’s “seemingly absolute 
protection” of private property is qualified by police power, “the natural tendency of human 
nature is to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property 
disappears”). 
63 Lochner v. New York., 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905). 
64 216 U.S. 1 (1910). 
65 Id. at 7, 47-48. 
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has absolute arbitrary power,”66 wrote Holmes.  The state, therefore, could 
place absolutely any conditions it wanted on such local business.  It did not 
matter to Holmes that to grant a state such unlimited power over the local 
business of a national company like Western Union might realistically amount 
to significant power over the company’s interstate business as well.67  Rather, 
apparently with one eye on the rising tide of the federal commerce power and 
the other on the constitutionally mandated state sovereignty that seemed to be 
sinking behind the horizon, Holmes opted for the result that was “more true to 
the scheme of the Union,” an utterly arbitrary sovereignty for the states but 
only in limited areas that could be defined out of the federal commerce 
power.68 
Similarly, but even more dramatically, in City of Denver v. Denver Union 
Water Co.,69 Holmes dissented from a ruling that a private water company was 
entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to an adequate rate of return for its 
services.70  Holmes reasoned that, since the city could at any time arbitrarily 
exclude the water company from the city altogether, it certainly could offer the 
company as low a rate of return as it liked, leaving the company to abandon the 
business if it so chose.71  Holmes acknowledged the reality that the water 
company, which had laid pipe throughout the city, and the city, which did not 
own the pipe, were mutually dependent.72  But he declared that “the mutual 
dependence of the parties upon each other in fact does not affect the 
consequences of their independence of each other in law.”73  Since the city 
could, in law if not in reality, exclude the water company for any reason at all, 
it could also set utterly inadequate rates for the company.74 
In these cases, Holmes declined to do what he was famous for doing in at 
least some other cases – looking behind the formalisms (like liberty of 
contract) to account for the reality of the situation.  Although Holmes had been 
very willing to halt the dragooning of businesses into the service of the state 
without just compensation, he had no qualms about the state equally destroying 
the property of a business through the mere regulation of rates.  Moreover, the 
standard he applied was not even deferential rationality review but absolute 
 
66 Id. at 54 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
67 Id. at 53-54 (arguing that the fact that a company might have to use interstate business 
earnings to pay state-imposed fees for maintaining local business “is no reason for cutting 
down powers that up to this time the states always have possessed”). 
68 Id. at 53 (“I think it more logical and more true to the scheme of the Union to 
recognize that what comes in only for a special purpose can claim constitutional protection 
only in its use for that purpose, and for nothing else.”). 
69 246 U.S. 178 (1918). 
70 Id. at 194. 
71 Id. at 196-97 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
72 Id. at 197 (recognizing that, practically, the water company “cannot stop furnishing 
water without being ruined, or the city stop receiving it without being destroyed”). 
73 Id. at 197-98. 
74 Id.. 
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judicial withdrawal from the case. 
CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding the formalism involved in such distinctions, Holmes 
carried out judicial review in at least three different ways: deference to 
dominant opinion in the execution of rationality review (Lochner); no apparent 
deference at all in cases where he detected “takings”; and no constitutional 
review at all in cases where he supposed the Fourteenth Amendment to have 
left absolute state sovereignty in place.  This last result seemed to rest on a 
belief that “the scheme of the Union” must survive the commerce power and 
its ever-growing potential to render a constitutionally, positivistically required 
federalism nugatory.  Thus although Holmes seemed to embrace a judicial role 
in imparting rationality to public power, he did not seem to believe that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of rationality inhered in the notion of 
government or republicanism or law; it was simply a (very desirable) 
requirement that the makers of the Fourteenth Amendment had generally 
chosen to place on the states.  But, as a merely positive imposition, it went no 
further than it went; Holmes seemed to take a certain positivistic delight in 
discovering areas of state power that the Fourteenth Amendment did not reach 
at all, perhaps because these small pockets of unreviewable arbitrariness 
reminded him (and the Platonists on the Court, he hoped) that rationality in 
government was a mere choice, which dominant opinion could endorse or not 
as it liked.75 
Unlike some other justices of his time, Holmes did not clearly manifest a 
particular political orientation in his judging.  Rather, he revealed a ceaseless 
ambition to find greatness in his profession (and be recognized for it). Holmes 
himself might have admitted that the greatness he sought in a life on the bench 
could not be had by the creation of distinctive doctrine (the unconstitutional 
conditions cases that he lost could have taught him that).  The very nature of 
law, forever honoring prior authority, discouraged explicit doctrinal 
innovation. But, in Holmes’s age, as in ours, the law seemed to cry out for 
someone to cut through the humbug of judicial rhetoric.  I think that Holmes 
did indeed contribute (along with other justices) a third idiom of Fourteenth 
Amendment review to the two that Cushman’s paper has identified,76 a 
language of takings which turned out to be as conventional as the other two 
and nearly interchangeable with them.  Each of the three fit easily with a 
general philosophy of deference in judicial review, and each called on the 
justices simply to exercise judgment when faced with a claim that a legislature 
had gone too far in light of American traditions of law.  But Holmes’s 
positivism, iconoclasm, and rhetorical skill persistently exposed the political 
 
75 Was it also evidence of Holmes’s positivism that, once he had lost to the majority in 
enough cases of unconstitutional conditions, he acquiesced in the law decreed by the Court 
and even went on to write opinions invalidating legislative imposition of unconstitutional 
conditions?  See Hale, supra note 7 at 338-43. 
76 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. 
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qualities of the justices’ work for all to see.  And at least in part, that is where 
his greatness lay and where, I suspect, he was happy for it to lie. 
It is true that, having exposed the arbitrariness and politics underlying the 
legalisms of “liberty of contract” and “arbitrary classification,” he only (and 
inevitably) substituted his own mainstream legalisms of “takings” and the like.  
In the meantime, however, he had enshrined in Supreme Court case law the 
rhetorical tools by which, as he said in a different setting, “the dragon” – any 
inherited legalism – could be gotten “out of his cave on to the plain and in the 
daylight, [where] you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his 
strength.”77  Holmes’s third face of Lochnerism did not really contribute a 
functionally different doctrine to Lochner-era constitutional review.  But his 
Lochner-era contributions, revealing the “faces” of the law as “masks,” made it 
forever afterwards an embarrassment – even for a judge – to pretend that the 
language of law could wholly conceal the political dimensions of the Court. 
 
77 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 699, 708 (1998; orig. 
1897). 
